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I. Introduction
Mr. S was only eighteen years old when he arrived poor and alone in
the United States. The brutal rape and beatings that he endured at the
hands of the government and guerillas in Guatemala caused him to become
so depressed that at times he could barely care for himself. Nevertheless,
after arriving in the United States, unfamiliar with the culture and lan-
guage, he applied for asylum to avoid the persecution or death he likely
would face in Guatemala.
Mr. S never received the asylum for which he applied. The government
denied his application not because he was ineligible, nor because he would
not face further persecution or even death if returned to Guatemala.
Instead, the government denied his application because Mr. S did not know
that he had to appear for a hearing and did not have the legal know-how to
prepare his application properly. Mr. S probably never would have faced
removal back to Guatemala if the government had provided Mr. S with an
attorney.
The Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of 8
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U.S.C. § 1362.1 This statute permits representation in immigration pro-
ceedings only when the representation is "at no expense to the govern-
ment."' 2 Although immigration judges must inform petitioners of their
right to an attorney and provide a list of pro bono legal services, immigra-
tion judges sometimes fail to inform petitioners of their rights and, more
frequently, provide lists that are outdated or incorrect. 3 Even if a refugee
can locate an attorney, often she or he cannot afford one. The result to
indigent petitioners is that they must navigate "the morass of immigration
law' 4 without the assistance of an attorney. The effect is that many claims
for refugee status-either through applications for asylum, relief under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT), 5 or restriction on removal6 -are
decided incorrectly. A recent study published in the Stanford Law Review
(Stanford Study) found that "[r]epresented asylum seekers were granted
asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three times as high as the 16.3% grant
rate for those without legal counsel."'7 Similarly, a recent Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report found that asylum seekers were three
times as likely to obtain asylum if they had legal representation. 8 In the
current system, many petitioners who are eligible for asylum-and there-
fore might face persecution or death after deportation-are being denied
relief erroneously because they lack counsel.
1. The closest the Court has come to addressing the constitutionality of § 1362 was
in Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (holding that resident non-citizens are enti-
tled to due process upon their return to the United States). See infra Part It.
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000).
3. See, e.g., Molaire v. Smith, 743 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("At no time
did the judge ever advise Petitioner of the availability of free legal services, nor did the
judge ascertain whether Petitioner received a list of free legal services.").
4. Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464-65 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Kwon v.
INS, 646 F.2d 909, 919 (5th Cir. 1981) ("Whatever guidance the regulations furnish to
those cognoscenti familiar with INS procedures, this court, despite many years of legal
experience, finds that they yield up meaning only grudgingly and that morsels of com-
prehension must be pried from mollusks of jargon."); Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d
Cir. 1977) ("Congress ... has enacted a baffling skein of provisions for the I.N.S. and
courts to disentangle."); Yuen Sang Low v. Att'y Gen., 479 F.2d 820, 821 (9th Cir. 1973)
("[W]e are in the never-never land of the Immigration and Nationality Act, where plain
words do not always mean what they say."); ELIZABETH HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL
107 (1985) ("The immigration laws are second only to the Internal Revenue Code in
complexity.").
5. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention
against Torture].
6. Restriction on removal is the formal term for the relief commonly referred to as
"withholding." Withholding of removal as described in this Article differs from with-
holding of removal under the CAT. See generally CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 34.03, 33.10 (rev. ed. 2008). For purposes of this Article, we
refer to all non-citizens who are applying for asylum, relief under the CAT, or restriction
on removal as "refugees."
7. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60
STAN. L. REv. 295, 340 (2007).
8. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION
ExiSTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 30 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.legistorm.com/ls-score/gao/pdf/2008/9/fu38994.pdf [hereinafter
GAO ASYLUM REPORT].
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This Article asserts that § 1362 is unconstitutional and that due pro-
cess requires the government to provide counsel for non-citizens who file
cases in fear of persecution and death-that is, for claims for asylum, relief
under the CAT, and restriction on removal. Due process protects every
person's interests in life, liberty, and property, regardless of her or his legal
status within the country. 9 Where death may result from an erroneous
denial of relief, a non-citizen's interest in life and liberty is implicated
directly.
As has been aptly stated in the criminal context, "death is different."'10
Where death is on the table, the Constitution requires certain guarantees
of reliability and accuracy. We argue that due process demands more in
these cases: it demands free legal counsel for indigent non-citizens apply-
ing for asylum, relief under the CAT, or restriction on removal.
Part II of this Article discusses the history of § 1362, explains past
jurisprudence on the right to counsel in immigration cases, and illustrates
that § 1362 is inconsistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence on the right
to counsel. Part III analyzes the right to counsel under the Mathews v.
Eldridge' balancing test, explains the impact of "death is different" juris-
prudence on the balancing test, and concludes that due process requires
the government to provide counsel in certain immigration proceedings.
Part IV briefly explains other scholars' determinations that counsel must
be provided in certain immigration proceedings and summarizes our rec-
ommendations. Part V summarizes our analysis and conclusions.
II. 8 U.S.C. § 1362
The United States is a party to the 1967 United Nations Protocol relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees, 12 which incorporates 1 3 articles 2-34 of the
1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 14 The
United States is also a party to the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 15 These docu-
ments form the international foundation for U.S. laws relating to asylum, 16
9. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982) (holding that resident non-citizens
are entitled to due process upon their return to the United States).
10. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) ("[D]eath ... is different in
both its severity and its finality.").
11. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
12. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
13. Id. art. 1.
14. United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signa-
ture July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
15. Convention against Torture, supra note 5.
16. Section 208 of the INA provides that any individual who demonstrates that he or
she is a refugee is eligible for asylum. INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A)
(2006). A refugee is any individual "who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." INA § 101(a)(42),
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006).
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relief under the CAT, 17 and restriction on removal. 18
Non-citizens may apply for asylum affirmatively before removal pro-
ceedings begin or defensively after. After a non-citizen petitions for affirm-
ative relief, an asylum officer conducts an initial interview to determine the
applicant's eligibility. 19 The Officer may "grant, deny, or refer" a claim.20
If the Officer refers an asylum claim-that is, if he determines that the
applicant "appears to be neither deportable nor inadmissible"-the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) issues a Notice to Appear for removal
proceedings, and the applicant enters defensive proceedings. 2 '
Applicants who have been referred by an asylum officer or who have
otherwise entered removal proceedings have access to defensive asylum
proceedings. 22 During these proceedings, a DHS attorney always repre-
sents the government. 2 3 Non-citizens can apply for relief under the CAT24
or restriction on removal25 defensively only-that is, they must wait to
appear before an immigration judge. 26
Courts consider removal proceedings civil in nature.2 7 Therefore, the
right to counsel in immigration proceedings derives from the Fifth Amend-
ment guarantee of due process.28 Due process requires fundamental fair-
17. An individual cannot be refouled to his or her country of origin if it is more
likely than not that the individual will be tortured. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restruc-
turing Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, Div. G (Oct. 21, 1998) (codified in
scattered sections in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.). See generally GORDON ET AL., supra note 6,
at § 33.10.
18. An individual may not be refouled to his or her country of origin if he or she
demonstrates that "it is more likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecu-
tion" if removed. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987) (quoting INS v.
Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30 (1984)). See generally GORDON ET AL., supra note 6, at
§ 34.03; REGINA GERMAIN, AILA's ASYLUM PRIMER: A PnACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. ASYLUM LAW
AND PROCEDURE 22-42 (4th ed. 2005).
19. See GERMAIN, supra note 18, at 393-96 for a helpful chart comparing affirmative
and defensive procedures and outlining eligibility requirements.
20. Id. at 395; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.1(b), 1208.9, 1208.14(b)-(c) (2008) (asylum officer
training and granting, denial, and referral, respectively).
21. GERMAIN, supra note 18, at 393-96; 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.18(b), 1208.2(c)(3)(ii)
(2008).
22. See GERMAIN, supra note 18, at 120.
23. Andrew 1. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation:
Ideas for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 741 (2002).
24. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16-.18 (2008).
25. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2008).
26. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(c)(1) (2008).
27. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 491
(1999) (holding that removal is not punishment, despite the fact that severe penalties,
including the loss of life, liberty, and property, may result from removal proceedings);
see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) ("A deportation proceeding
is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an
unlawful entry .... "); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) ("Deporta-
tion, however severe its consequences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather
than a criminal procedure."). For a more in-depth discussion of the costs of errors in
immigration proceedings, see infra Part III.C.
28. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) (holding that procedures for
deporting children do not violate procedural due process); Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21 (1982); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
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ness, including fairness in trials.29 Part of fundamental fairness in
immigration proceedings includes the right to counsel of the petitioner's
choosing.30 Congress intended to implement this right in 8 U.S.C. § 1362:
In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in any appeal
proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal proceed-
ings, the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented (at
no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in
such proceedings, as he shall choose.3 1
Several additional provisions reinforce this right.3 2 For example, both
the government and the immigration judge must notify the applicant of the
right to counsel and provide a list of pro bono representatives. 33 In addi-
tion, immigration judges have a duty to develop the record fully for unrep-
resented applicants.34  To develop the record fully, judges must
("[A]liens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only
after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due
process of law.").
29. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) (explaining that funda-
mental fairness rooted in due process is "essential to the very concept of justice" in state
criminal trials).
30. lavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 128-29 (2d Cir. 2000) (indicating that petitioners
have a right to hire counsel of their choosing).
31. INA § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) (emphasis added).
32. Until recently, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was always an available
means, as a matter of due process, to enforce the § 1362 right. See Matter of Assaad, 23
I. & N. Dec. 553, 560 (B.I.A. 2003) ("[T]he principle that aliens may have a valid claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel if an attorney's actions were so deficient as to fore-
close the fundamental fairness of the proceedings is settled law in most circuits."); Mat-
ter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988). At least three circuit courts of appeals,
however, have ruled against a due process right to effective assistance of counsel, on the
theory that actions of private counsel cannot be considered "official action" for due
process purposes. See Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 2008); Afanwi v.
Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 798 (4th Cir. 2008); Magala v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 523, 525
(7th Cir. 2005). In the final days of the Bush Administration, Attorney General Mukasey
overruled Assaad and Lozada on the same basis, holding that due process does not guar-
antee a right to effective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings, and limiting
review of such claims to his discretion. Matter of Compean, 24 1. & N. Dec. 710,
710-11 (Att'y Gen. 2009) ("[Tlhere is no Fifth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel in removal proceedings."). In June 2009, however, Attorney General Holder
vacated Attorney General Mukasey's decision and ordered new rulemaking on how to
remedy ineffective assistance problems. Matter of Compean, 25 1. & N. Dec. 1, 2-3
(Att'y Gen. 2009) (noting that Attorney General Mukasey's holding "depended in part
on [his] conclusion that there is no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel
in removal proceedings. Because that conclusion is not necessary either to decide these
cases under pre-Compean standards or to initiate a rulemaking process, this Order
vacates Compean in its entirety."). Because we argue that refugees have a due process
right to counsel (a position that Attorney General Mukasey rejected), we also reject any
claim that refugees do not have a right to effective assistance of counsel. See, e.g.,
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (recognizing that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."). Such arguments, however,
are generally beyond the scope of this Article.
33. INA § 208(d)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(4) (2008); 8 C.F.R. § 12 40.10(a) (2008).
34. INA § 240(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (2008) ("The immigration judge
shall . . .interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses."); see
Matter of S-M-J, 21 1. & N. Dec. 722, 727 (1997) ("Although the burden of proof is not
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"scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for
all the relevant facts." 35 Nevertheless, as demonstrated infra,36 this duty
may seriously undermine the judge's role as a neutral arbitrator. To the
extent that the immigration judge delegates this responsibility, the refu-
gee's due process rights may be violated by forcing the government to con-
front an "unfair conflict of interest" in developing the defendant's case
while making its own case for deportation. 3 7 Moreover, it does not
improve the individual's understanding of the proceedings and, conse-
quently, his or her ability to gather probative evidence.
Despite the inadequate protections that § 1362 provides to non-citi-
zens (both indigent and otherwise), several courts have upheld the statute
as constitutional. In the 1975 case, Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS,3 8 the Sixth
Circuit held that non-citizens did not have an unqualified right to free legal
counsel in deportation proceedings. 3 9 The Sixth Circuit, however, found
that due process may require the government to provide an attorney to
indigent non-citizens where "an unrepresented indigent alien would
require counsel to present his position adequately to an immigration
judge."40 This case-by-case approach has amounted to no right at all, as no
court has ever found that due process required free counsel in any specific
case.
41
Indeed, some courts have even gone so far as to state directly that
"there is no right to appointed counsel" in these proceedings. 42 Other
courts, however, have at least acknowledged the important need for attor-
neys, even if those courts could not provide as much because of current
immigration precedent. For example, the court in Baires v. INS stressed the
"critical role of counsel in deportation proceedings" and noted that, in
some areas of the country, it is difficult, expensive, and at times impossible
to obtain paid counsel.4 3 This view recognizes that denying immigrants
counsel is both unjust and bad public policy. Just as important, this view
on the Immigration Judge, if background information is central to an alien's claim, and
the Immigration Judge relies on the country conditions in adjudicating the alien's case,
the source of the Immigration Judge's knowledge of the particular country must be
made part of the record.").
35. Al Khouri v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 465 (8th Cir. 2004) (quotingJacinto v. INS,
208 F.3d 725, 733 (9th Cir. 2000)).
36. Infra text accompanying notes 144-47.
37. Pangilinan v. Holder, 568 F.3d 708, 709-10 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding refugee's
due process rights were violated because immigration judge "inexplicably delegated his
duties to develop this unrepresented petitioner's case to the attorney for the
government").
38. 516 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1975).
39. Id. at 569.
40. Id. at 568 n.3.
41. See, e.g., Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1986) (indicating
that the petitioner was "unable to secure counsel at his own expense," but holding that
this was not a denial of due process).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Lara-Unzueta, 287 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (N.D. Ill.
2003) (stating that "there is no right to appointed counsel.").
43. Baires v. INS, 856 F.2d 89, 91 n.2, 93 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988).
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recognizes that denying immigrants counsel is inconsistent with case law
regarding the right to counsel in other contexts.
In In re Gault, for instance, the Supreme Court established that due
process requires appointed counsel for juveniles in delinquency proceed-
ings. 44 The Court noted that because a juvenile's interest in preventing her
or his loss of liberty is so great, the juvenile's interests could not be pro-
tected adequately by probation officers, whose role it is to file complaints
against the juvenile.4 5 The Court also flatly rejected that the presiding
judge could advocate for the juvenile.4 6
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, by contrast, the Court adopted a case-by-case
approach for appointed counsel in probation hearings.4 7 The Court
acknowledged that, in some circumstances, "the effectiveness of the rights
guaranteed ...depend[s] on the use of skills which the probationer or
parolee is unlikely to possess, '4 8 but ultimately held that countervailing
considerations, such as maintaining an informal forum and a rehabilitative
atmosphere, counseled in favor of a more flexible approach. 49 Similarly, in
Lassiter v. Durham County, the Court adopted a case-by-case approach in
adjudications of parental rights.50 There, the Court determined that,
although due process mandates appointed counsel for all indigent litigants
who are at risk of losing their personal physical liberty, it does not man-
date appointed counsel for all parents who are in danger of losing parental
rights.51 The distinction, again, turned on the weight of the private
interests.5 2
The differences between Gault, Gagnon, and Lassiter are irrelevant,
insofar as all three holdings embrace the basic Mathews v. Eldridge5 3 bal-
ancing test. As we explain below, under Eldridge, the government must
appoint counsel for an indigent immigration petitioner where a risk of
detention or death exists-risks that exist, by definition, in nearly every
claim involving asylum, restriction on removal, and relief under the CAT.
The time has come to reevaluate the need for appointed counsel in these
contexts.
44. In re Gauh, 387 U.S. 1, 35 (1967).
45. Id. at 36.
46. Id.
47. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). The Sixth Circuit approved of
Gagnon's approach in the deportation context in Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565,
568 (6th Cir. 1975).
48. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786.
49. Id.
50. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32
(1981) ("[Nleither can we say that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel
in every parental termination proceeding. We therefore adopt the standard found appro-
priate in Gagnon v. Scarpelli .
51. Id. at 26-27.
52. See id.
53. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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111. Death (After Deportation) is Different and Mathews v. Eldridge
An analysis of the factors enumerated in Eldridge suggests that appli-
cants for refugee status have a right to greater due process safeguards than
they currently receive. Under the Eldridge test, courts must balance the
private party's interest and the risk associated with a wrongful determina-
tion against the government's interests. 54 The Eldridge Court defined
those three factors as follows:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.5 5
The remainder of this Part considers the following: (1) the govern-
ment's interest in maintaining the current procedures for refugee status
determination; (2) the applicant's interest in an accurate determination,
using "death is different" as the paradigm for examining that interest; (3)
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (4) the proper
balance between the government's interest against the applicant's interest,
including whether the Constitution requires adding procedural safeguards
to refugee status determination proceedings.
A. The Government's Interest
The judiciary usually defers to the federal government's plenary power
to regulate immigration. 56 The Supreme Court has held that Congres-
sional authority is at its peak in the immigration context: "Over no conceiv-
able subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete." 5 7
The Court has deferred to the federal government on matters of immi-
gration as it would never consider doing in many other areas of law. As
one commentator has noted, "[I1n an undeviating line of cases spanning
almost one hundred years, the Court has declared itself powerless to review
even those immigration provisions that explicitly classify on such disfa-
vored bases as race, gender, and legitimacy. '58 The government's power
also reaches what courts normally would consider violations of the First
Amendment.5 9 The government's plenary power over immigration sug-
54. Id. at 335.
55. Id.
56. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
57. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co., 214 U.S. at 339.
58. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional
Power, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984) (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977)
(classification based on gender and legitimacy); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698 (1893) (classification based on race); Chae Chan Ping v. United States,
130 U.S. 581 (1889) (classification based on race)).
59. Kleindienstv. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 756, 769-70 (1972) (rejecting respondents'
claim that the government's refusal to admit a socialist scholar to the United States vio-
lated their First Amendment rights); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529 (1954) (rejecting
alien's argument that the Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987,
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gests a high interest in maintaining whatever procedures the federal gov-
ernment has deemed appropriate. 60
The plenary power doctrine itself, however, contains serious flaws.
Plenary power is inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment and the constitu-
tional democracy of the United States.6 1 The Tenth Amendment reserves
powers not enumerated in the Constitution to the states and the people.6 2
Moreover, early Supreme Court decisions suggested an enumerative-only
view of federal power. For example, in McCulloch v. Maryland,6 3 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall explained that the federal government cannot act unless the
Constitution gives it authority to do so or unless the action is reasonably
implied from an enumerated power.6 4 He specifically contrasted reasona-
bly implied powers with "great substantive and independent power[s]"
such as the power of making war, levying taxes, or regulating commerce.
65
This view of the federal government's power stands in stark contrast
to the inherent authority doctrine the Supreme Court announced in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co. 6 6 in 1936. In Curtiss-Wright the Court
explained that the enumerated powers doctrine "is categorically true only
in respect of our internal affairs." 67 Numerous commentators have
attacked Curtiss-Wright as inconsistent with the Constitution and the prin-
ciples upon which it is based.68 Scholars have suggested that Curtiss-
Wright is an anomaly worthy of repudiating in favor of a more mainstream
which authorized deportation of any alien who has been a member of the Communist
Party, violated the alien's right to due process); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 588, 596 (1952) (finding that the Alien Registration Act of 1940 § 23, 8 U.S.C.
§ 137 (repealedJune 27, 1952), which authorized deportation of any legal resident alien
because of membership in the Communist Party, did not violate Due Process Clause).
60. Although the authority and the interest of a given branch of government are not
necessarily related on a one-to-one basis, the two certainly are related. Given the oppor-
tunity, the Supreme Court likely would hold that the federal government's plenary
power to regulate immigration would weigh heavily in its favor under an Eldridge balanc-
ing test. But see David M. Grable, Note, Personhood Under the Due Process Clause: A
Constitutional Analysis of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 820, 848 (1998) (describing the question of whether the
Supreme Court would find the plenary power of the federal government to weigh heavily
on the government's side under Eldridge as "difficult.").
61. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution . . . are reserved . . . to the people."); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of
Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1 (2002) (arguing that the inherent
powers doctrine is inconsistent with the enumerated powers principles upon which the
United States was founded and based on nationalist and racist views of federal power
dating to the mid-nineteenth century).
62. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
63. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
64. Id. at 411.
65. Id.
66. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
67. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added).
68. See. e.g., HAROLD HONOJu KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990)
(criticizing Curtiss-Wright as "a dramatically different vision of the National Security
Constitution from that which has prevailed since the founding of the Republic.");
CHARLES A. LOFGREN, The Foreign Relations Power: United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, in GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE
Cornell International Law Journal
constitutional understanding.69
Moreover, Curtiss-Wright stands in contrast to the more limiting
approach taken by the Court fifty years earlier. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,70 the
Court held that a person's equal protection and due process rights do not
depend on alienage. 71 The Court specifically repudiated the plenary
power doctrine as a source of government authority to discriminate against
non-citizens: "[S]overeignty itself is, of course, not subject to law, for it is
the author and source of law; but in our system, while sovereign powers are
delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the
people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts." 72
Yick Wo accords with the view announced by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCullough and stands in stark contrast to the wide latitude courts cur-
rently give the federal government on immigration issues. As one commen-
tator has observed, "the power over exclusion and deportation is far from
normalized .... [Clourts frequently agree, that federal immigration laws
should be subject to little or no judicial review, based on the immigration
power's roots in 'national sovereignty, foreign relations, and the fundamen-
tally political character of nationality decisions."' 73
Aside from applying the plenary power doctrine to immigration law,
in Landon v. Plasencia the Supreme Court explicitly characterized the inter-
est in "efficient administration of the immigration laws at the border" as
"weighty."74 The Court continued, "[lIt must weigh heavily in the balance
that control over matters of immigration is a sovereign prerogative, largely
within the control of the Executive and the Legislature. ' 75 Thus, the Court
has recognized both plenary power and efficient administration of immi-
gration laws as government interests that weigh in favor of maintaining the
current procedures used in refugee status determinations.
Those two interests aside, however, the government should also be
concerned with another interest: promoting compliance with treaty obliga-
tions by ensuring accurate determinations of refugee status. The interest
in treaty compliance applies most directly to determinations of eligibility
for relief under the CAT and restriction on removal. Both are rooted in
167, 205 (1986) ("If good history is a requisite to good constitutional law, then Curtiss-
Wright ought to be relegated to history.").
69. See Cleveland, supra note 61, at 6 (reviewing the scholarship, including, inter
alia, Koh and Lofgren); Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U.
CoLo. L. REV. 1089, 1104-07 (1999) (predicting an end to foreign affairs exceptional-
ism); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REv.
1617, 1659-60 (1997) (rejecting Curtiss-Wright as authority for a federal common law
of foreign relations between and among the federal government and the states).
70. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
71. Id. at 368-69.
72. Id. at 374; see also Cleveland, supra note 61, at 121 (discussing Yick Wo as a
repudiation of the inherent powers doctrine).
73. Cleveland, supra note 61, at 162-63 (quoting Brief for the United States at 8,
12-14, 22 in Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998)).
74. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (applying Mathews v. Eldridge bal-
ancing test in holding that due process requires notice of a deportation hearing).
75. Id.
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international treaties adopted and implemented by the United States.7 6
Thus, an inaccurate determination of eligibility for either relief under the
CAT or restriction on removal could damage relations with foreign govern-
ments for two reasons.77
First, the failure to comply with any treaty damages the federal govern-
ment's ability to enter into similar treaties in the future because the govern-
ment's failure to abide by a treaty undermines its reliability as a treaty
partner. 78 Second, because domestic rules for CAT and restriction on
removal claims are rooted in international law,79 a commitment to accurate
determinations in those contexts demonstrates the United States' commit-
ment to international law generally.
Asylum claims present a slightly different case. Although the United
States is a signatory of the United Nations Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees, 80 grants of asylum are not mandatory.8 1 Therefore, asylum seek-
ers' opportunities to avail themselves of the benefits of treaties and interna-
tional relations are limited. U.S. asylum law, however, is based directly on
the Convention and the Protocol8 2 and relies strongly on guidelines
adopted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 83
Therefore, the government's interest in maintaining the current level of
procedural protections for refugees is not as high as it is for other non-
citizens because the plenary power doctrine is mitigated by the govern-
ment's countervailing interest in complying with its treaty obligations. As
Justice Kennedy stated in Roper v. Simmons, "[tihe opinion of the world
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected and
76. See supra Part II (indicating that U.S. refugee law is derived from the U.N. Refu-
gee Convention, Protocol, and CAT).
77. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367 (2008) (listing "rela-
tions with foreign governments" as a "plainly compelling interest" of the federal
government).
78. George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International
Law, XXXIJ. LEGAL STUD. S95, S98 (2002) ("[Elven in an increasingly integrated interna-
tional system, reputational concerns cannot by themselves begin to ensure a high level of
compliance with every international agreement. At the same time, however, reputational
concerns are an important force for compliance in connection with certain
agreements.").
79. See supra text accompanying notes 12-18.
80. See id.
81. See United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 14,
art. 32 ("The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save
on grounds of national security or public order .... [TIhe expulsion of such a refugee
shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of
law."). The implementing legislation makes the grant discretionary. See INA § 208, 8
U.S.C. § 1158 (2006).
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Proce-
dures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status (1992), available at http://www.unhcr.
org/publ/PUBL/3d58el3b4.pdf; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 (1987)
("[T]he Handbook provides significant guidance in construing the Protocol .... It has
been widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol
establishes.") (citations omitted).
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significant confirmation for our own conclusions. '8 4 The United States
enters treaties because it believes in the rights and privileges the treaties
protect.8 5 The United States cares about its image abroad, believes in a
more just society, and strives for a more decent legal system.8 6 This is why
the Supreme Court has looked to international law and the examples set by
other nations when holding that it is unconstitutional to impose the death
penalty on juveniles8 7 and to restrict the rights of homosexuals through
discriminatory anti-sodomy laws.8 8 Similarly, here, the government
should look to and abide by the country's international obligations to
maintain appropriate and civilized procedures and laws.
B. The Interest of Refugees
Mathews v. Eldridge requires consideration of "the private interest that
will be affected by the official action. ' '8 9 We consider this interest from the
perspective that "death is different."90 In other words, avoiding death, tor-
ture, and serious bodily harm is the refugee's "private interest" that is
affected "by the official action," i.e., removal from the United States. 9 1 The
death penalty principle that "death is different" suggests that the interest of
refugees in the outcome of their cases could hardly be higher.
The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized the need for reliability
and accuracy of the outcome of death penalty determinations. 9 2 In Gregg
v. Georgia93 the Court explained, "[W]here discretion is afforded a sentenc-
ing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action."94 Accordingly, the Court has adopted a myriad of procedural pro-
tections for death-eligible defendants.95
Two major concerns motivate the Court to require greater reliability
and accuracy: (1) the irreversibility of death and (2) the gravity of the pun-
ishment. The Court has stated that "death is a different kind of punish-
ment from any other which may be imposed in this country .... From the
84. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
85. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
111 YALE LJ. 1935 (2002) (discussing why states enter into treaties).
86. See id.
87. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.
88. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
89. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335-36 (1976).
90. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) ("[D]eath is ... different.., in
both its severity and its finality.").
91. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335-36.
92. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ("To avoid [arbitrary sentencing], an
aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty .. "); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980); Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358
("It is of vital importance ... that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and
appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion."); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976).
93. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
94. Id. at 189 (emphasis added).
95. See infra text accompanying note 128.
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point of view of the defendant, it is different in both its severity and its
finality."9 6
The finality of death is important because once the defendant has
been executed, it is impossible to correct erroneous determinations of guilt
or culpability.9 7 The severity of death, by contrast, is important because of
the dignitary interest that the death penalty implicates. 98 The dignitary
interest is rooted in the inviolability of the human person. 99
The Court has noted that the Eighth Amendment bars a state from
treating a person as less than human, even in death: "The basic concept
underlying the [Clause] is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the
State has the power to punish, the [Clause] stands to assure that this power
be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." 10 0 In other words,
the Eighth Amendment protects a prisoner's dignity from the powerful arm
of the state.
The same characteristics-irreversible outcomes that implicate digni-
tary interests-also feature prominently in applications for refugee status.
A wrong decision likely will harm the refugee irreparably. Of course,
wrongful deportation leads to irreparable harm in a less direct sense than
wrongful conviction of a capital offense, insofar as the U.S. government did
not inflict the final blow. 1 1 Nevertheless, the harm in each case is irrepa-
96. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 357 (citations omitted).
97. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining
that death's irreversibility is reason for jurors to have the final say in its application in a
given case); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 399 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing fact that "capital punishment is the most extreme and uniquely irreversible expres-
sion of societal condemnation" as a reason why Alabama's compulsory sentencing
language was unconstitutional).
98. Of course, the test for whether a given punishment violates the Eighth Amend-
ment explicitly requires the justices to consider whether the punishment "comports with
the basic concept of human dignity." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182. Other punishments are
considered under the same test, but the dignity implications of death weigh more heavily
than other judgments, for the Court rarely strikes down any other legislatively pre-
scribed punishment as violating the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11, 26-28, 30-31 (2003) (holding that California's three strikes law was not
grossly disproportionate and, therefore, did not violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on
cruel and unusual punishment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that
applying the death penalty to the mentally retarded constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment). The death penalty clearly implicates the Eighth Amendment. See Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). There was no majority
opinion in Furman, and Brennan's position that the death penalty was a per se violation
of the Eighth Amendment was repudiated. See Gregg, 428 U.S. 153. But see Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (citing "human dignity" as a reason that sentencing
persons who were juveniles at the time of the crime to death is unconstitutional). The
imposition of death, especially by a regime that does so in a fashion sufficient to qualify
an immigrant for asylum, restriction on removal, or CAT relief, surely also implicates a
refugee's dignitary interests.
99. See R. George Wright, Dignity and Conflicts of Constitutional Values: The Case of
Free Speech and Equal Protection, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 527, 532-34 (2006) (listing free-
dom from bodily intrusion and privacy as two major values protected by human
dignity).
100. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
101. By way of contrast, the concern underlying the "death is different" doctrine is
that a death row inmate might be wrongfully put to death as punishment for a crime he
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rable. Just as there is no remedy for wrongful death, nothing can undo the
suffering of a refugee: persecution, serious bodily harm, or even death. 10 2
Moreover, the harm in the refugee and capital contexts is similarly
severe in two respects. First, the refugee facing death is threatened with the
very same harm as in the capital context. Second, the refugee facing tor-
ture, serious bodily injury, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment faces
a serious affront to her dignity. 10 3 Indeed, the jus cogens norm prohibiting
torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is derived directly from
the international respect for human dignity. 10 4 Likewise, a refugee who
faces persecution on account of a protected ground faces a serious affront
to her dignity: she is persecuted for a part of her life that she either cannot
or should not be required to change.' 0 5 Such persecution is inherently
personal and implicates a dignitary interest.106
The Supreme Court's treatment of a death penalty litigant's dignity
interest is rooted in the Eighth Amendment. 10 7 A different constitutional
provision-the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment-governs
immigration proceedings. 10 8 The source of the bar, however, is irrelevant
to the analogy; the motivating rationale-i.e., the person's interest in avoid-
ing this type of harm-remains the same.
Therefore, in the Eldridge analysis, the interest of the refugee parallels
either did not commit or did not deserve to die for committing. There have been over
100 DNA exonerations for death row inmates. Death Penalty Information Center, Inno-
cence and the Crisis in the American Death Penalty (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-crisis-american-death-penalty. Unfortunately, the
prospect of wrongfully putting someone to death is neither remote nor far-fetched.
102. Psychologists have documented lasting psychological effects of torture and perse-
cution, including post-traumatic stress disorder and severe depression, which can inter-
fere with an individual's daily functioning for years after persecution has ended. J.
David Kinzie & James M. Jaranson, Refugee and Asylum Seekers, in ELLEN T. GERRITY ET
AL., THE MENTAL HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF TORTURE 111-16 (1997); CARLOS MADARIAGA,
CENTRO DE SALUD MENTAL Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, PSYCHOSOCIAL TRAUMA, POST TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER AND TORTURE (2002), http://www.cintras.org/textos/monografias/
monog-trauma-psicosocial ingles.pdf.
103. Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1726-27 (2005) (explaining the connection between the law's
respect for human dignity and its prohibition of torture).
104. Id.
105. Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985), overruled on other
grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). In Matter of Acosta,
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) specifically stated that membership in a partic-
ular social group must be based on shared, immutable characteristics. Id. A characteris-
tic is immutable if the characteristic is one that "the members of the group either cannot
change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individ-
ual identities or consciences." Id. Similarly, the other bases for asylum-race, religion,
nationality, and political opinion-form an integral part of the non-citizen's identity.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). Even when those characteris-
tics are imputed to the refugee, meaning that others believe that the refugee possesses
certain characteristics that he or she does not, the realization of that imputation and
persecution on that basis may inevitably define the refugee's sense of self.
106. Waldron, supra note 103, at 1726-27.
107. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
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the interest of death penalty litigants. 10 9 Like a death-eligible defendant, a
refugee faces extremely high stakes: the loss of life or "all that makes life
worth living." 1 10 The Court has recognized that death penalty litigants
face risks qualitatively different than other persons facing punishment,"'
and that refugees face risks qualitatively different than other immi-
grants.112 Thus, like the death-eligible defendant, the refugee has a high
interest in the proper determination of her claim.
Finally, aside from death penalty jurisprudence, the United States has
already articulated its interest in barring the kinds of harm that refugees
generally suffer. It has done so by attaching criminal penalties tO113 and
otherwise prohibiting' 14 the kind of actions that would qualify a person as
a refugee. These broad bars, like the notion that death is different, compel
the finding that a refugee has a weighty interest in being free from the
harms that would make her eligible for relief.
More than eighty years ago, Justice Brandeis wrote that deportation
can result "in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth
living." 115 The same is true today.
C. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The risk of erroneous deprivation of refugee status recently has come
under national scrutiny. 1 16 The scrutiny largely is the result of the Stan-
ford Study. 1 17 The study demonstrated the importance of representation
in immigration proceedings before an immigration judge:
The results of the cross-tabulation analysis confirm earlier studies showing
that whether an asylum seeker is represented in court is the single most
important factor affecting the outcome of her case. Represented asylum seek-
ers were granted asylum at a rate of 45.6%, almost three times as high as the
16.3% grant rate for those without legal counsel. The regression analysis
confirmed that, with all other variables in the study held constant, repre-
109. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335-36 (1976) (indicating that individ-
ual interests must be analyzed).
110. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (discussing the possible effects
of a deportation order).
111. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) ("[Djeath is ... different. . . in
both its severity and its finality.").
112. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987) (noting that even just a
ten percent risk of persecution is sufficient to qualify a person for asylum); Ng Fung Ho,
259 U.S. at 284 (noting that deportation can result "in loss of both property and life, or
of all that makes life worth living.").
113. See 18 U.S.C. § 2441(d)(1)(A) (2006) (proscribing torture).
114. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 948r(b) (prohibiting statements obtained by torture in a
military commission); 15 C.F.R. § 742.11 (imposing special export controls on exports
of implements of torture); 28 C.F.R. § 200.1 (barring the removal of alien terrorists if
doing so would violate article 3 of the CAT).
115. Ng Fung Ho, 259 U.S. at 284.
116. See, e.g., Julia Preston, Big Disparities Found in Judging of Asylum Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/31/washing-
ton/31asylum.htm; Bill Frogameni, For Asylum Seekers, A Fickle System, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, July 3, 2007, at 3, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/07
03/p03s03-ussc.html?page=2.
117. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7.
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sented asylum seekers were substantially more likely to win their case than
those without representation.118
The study also pointed to other disparities in asylum determinations
by immigration courts. It found wide disparities both among courts and
among judges within a single court.1 19 For example, Colombian asylum
seekers were "232% more likely to win their claims in Orlando than they
[were] in Atlanta.' 1 20 In New York, one judge granted only 6% of asylum
claims, while another three judges in the same office granted 80% or more
of asylum claims. 12 1 A recent GAO report confirmed that there are signifi-
cant variations in asylum outcomes based on seven factors wholly unre-
lated to the merits of the asylum seeker's claim: (1) whether the claim was
filed affirmatively or defensively; (2) the applicant's nationality; (3) the
time period in which the asylum decision was made; (4) whether the appli-
cant was represented by counsel; (5) whether the applicant filed her claim
within one year of arriving in the United States; (6) whether the applicant
claimed dependents on the application; and (7) whether the applicant had
ever been detained. 12 2 For example, if the applicant was represented by
counsel, she was more than three times as likely to be granted asylum. 1 23
While it is impossible to know the percentage of wrongly decided asy-
lum cases, based on the study it is clear that the merits of any given case
are not the main, or even a substantial, factor in determining the outcome
of the case. 124 Factors such as whether a particular immigration judge
hears the claim, whether the applicant was represented, and in which immi-
gration court the applicant brings her claim are each improper but highly
relevant factors in predicting the outcome of asylum cases. 12 5 The demon-
strated impact of factors irrelevant to the merits of a claim for refugee sta-
tus strongly suggests a high risk of an erroneous deprivation of a refugee's
life and liberty interests under the current procedures. 126
D. The Benefits and Costs of the Proposed Remedy: A Refugee's Right
to Counsel
Because death is final and implicates human dignity, the Court has
demanded additional procedural protections for people facing the death
penalty.12 7 These include the following, all of which impose significant
118. Id. at 340.
119. Id. at 328-41.
120. Id. at 330.
121. Id. at 334.
122. GAO ASYLUM REPORT, supra note 8, at 7.
123. Id. at 30.
124. Id. at 7-11.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Baltazar-Alcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (indicating
that the requirements for relief are often "daunting enough for a seasoned immigration
lawyer" and may indeed be impossible for petitioners with a limited knowledge of
English to understand).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 90-100; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (rev. 1st ed. 2003), available at http://www.
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costs on the courts: guided, individualized discretion for a court's determi-
nation of death eligibility; right to voir dire into potential jurors' views on
the death penalty; automatic review of death sentences; and a trial bifur-
cated into guilt and penalty phases with jury verdicts at the end of each
phase. 12
8
Legislative bodies also have provided protections unique to death pen-
alty litigants. For example, most states usually assign two defense attor-
neys to each death-eligible case, 12 9 and a statutory right to counsel exists
that extends to federal habeas corpus proceedingsl 3 0-a right not provided
to litigants sentenced to lesser punishments. Each of these procedural pro-
tections is intended to improve reliability in the determination of the
proceedings.
In drawing the analogy to the refugee context, we propose something
much more modest: provide a right to counsel at government expense for
refugees in deportation proceedings.
Under Lassiter, litigants with an important liberty interest at stake are
presumptively due a government-funded attorney.' 3 ' As discussed supra,
refugees face incredibly high stakes-including imprisonment and death-
if they are deported to a country where they are persecuted. 13 2 Moreover,
the risk of erroneous deprivation of the refugee's rights is disturbingly
high. Thus, wrongfully deporting a refugee clearly implicates an important.
liberty interest.
A right to counsel is indispensable to a fair determination in asylum
hearings for five reasons. 133 Such a right would (1) help to erase not only
the disparity in outcomes between represented and unrepresented appli-
cants but also (2) erase the disparity in outcomes among different immi-
gration judges. Such a right would also (3) eliminate predatory practices
by many immigration attorneys and notarios134 while (4) helping the appli-
cant overcome substantial personal and cultural barriers to presenting her
abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines
2003.pdf [hereinafter ABA GUIDELINES].
128. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (individualized con-
sideration); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (voir dire on death penalty
views); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia statute based on its
bifurcated trial and automatic review of death sentences by the Georgia Supreme Court).
129. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 127, at 28 (recommending the appointment of a
minimum of two attorneys to work on each death penalty case).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2006).
131. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 25-27
(1981) ("[lI]t is the defendant's interest in personal freedom, and not simply the special
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the
right to appointed counsel .... ).
132. See supra text accompanying notes 89-115.
133. See Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1276
(1975) (arguing that procedural protections should be adapted to each specific context).
Judge Friendly ranked "counsel" as seventh out of eleven priorities for providing a fair
hearing. Id. at 1279-94. The other procedural protections, Judge Friendly suggests, are,
by and large, in place of immigration proceedings. Despite these procedural protections,
irregularities persist. See supra text accompanying notes 116-26.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 142-43.
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claim effectively. Finally, providing counsel would (5) inject an important
counterbalance to DHS attorneys in proceedings that are already adver-
sarial but lopsided in the government's favor.
Providing counsel to refugees would directly address the disparity in
outcomes between the represented and unrepresented. 135 The Stanford
Study showed that currently, around 45% of represented applicants have
their claims granted. 13 6 Only 16% of unrepresented applicants win the
same relief.137 Guaranteeing applicants counsel would directly address
this disparity and result in courts hearing more meritorious claims.
Providing counsel also would address the disparity in outcomes
among immigration judges.138 Government-funded counsel for refugees
would act as an external check on the immigration judge's broad discre-
tion. Counsel would act as a check by (1) ensuring that the court follows
proper procedures, (2) presenting the facts of her client's case, and (3) pro-
viding legal expertise to guide the refugee through the proceeding. Immi-
gration proceedings are complex, and refugee applicants are from countries
with different legal systems. Facing complex adjudicative proceedings is
intimidating for the average U.S. citizen; it is all the more difficult for a
person wholly unfamiliar with U.S. law.
Moreover, unlike other contexts in which the government seeks to do
"mass justice,"'1 39 applicants here must overcome major cultural, emo-
tional, and political obstacles to make their claims. Refugees may be reluc-
tant to talk about the persecutory treatment they received at the hands of
their home country's government because of cross-cultural miscommunica-
tions, psychological impairment, or fear of their home government's influ-
ence in the United States. 140 Counsel would act as a friendly face and ally
who can "bring out facts ignored by or unknown to the authorities." 14 1
Relatedly, providing counsel would force ineffective and overpriced
representation out of the system. Currently, "vulnerable immigrants are
preyed upon by unlicensed notarios and unscrupulous appearance attor-
neys who extract heavy fees in exchange for false promises and shoddy,
ineffective representation." 14 2 Providing counsel would eliminate the
135. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 329, 340-41 (outlining disparities in
asylum grant rates between different immigration courts and between applicants repre-
sented by counsel and those unrepresented).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 329 (showing that a Chinese applicant "unlucky enough to have her
case heard before the Atlanta Immigration Court had a 7% chance of success on her
asylum claim, as compared to 47% nationwide.").
139. See Friendly, supra note 133, at 1279-95 (enumerating and ranking procedural
protections that should be considered in administrative, or "mass justice," proceedings).
140. See Schoenholtz &Jacobs, supra note 23, at 745 (explaining that "fear of author-
ity, language barriers, general confusion, and . . . lack of knowledge about . . . legal
rights" may deter an asylum seeker from communicating her credible fear effectively).
141. See Friendly, supra note 133, at 1287.
142. Morales Apolinar v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2008). These
problems are particularly acute for the many detained individuals whom DHS has trans-
ferred or could transfer to remote facilities. The financial burden of DHS's transfer pol-
icy makes it difficult for detained individuals to obtain and retain competent counsel.
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problem of notarios and dramatically mitigate the impact of bad represen-
tation by creating an official, uniform funding source for attorneys repre-
senting refugees. 14 3
Finally, introducing additional counsel into such proceedings is likely
to make hearings more adversarial and less inquisitorial or investiga-
tory.144 The government is not averse to injecting professional advocates
into the asylum, CAT, and restriction on removal context: DHS is uni-
formly represented by lawyers in immigration proceedings. 145 In fact, the
problem of one-sided representation already undermines the inquisitorial
and investigatory aspirations of the immigration tribunal.14 6 The need for
a judge to inquire into and develop a pro bono applicant's claim directly
undermines his or her neutrality and provides an insufficient counterbal-
ance to trained and experienced DHS attorneys. 147
Other procedural protections, such as judicial review, the making of a
record, and the right to have a decision made based on the evidence
presented, are already largely in place. 148 Despite the presence of such
procedures, gross disparities persist in asylum hearings. Providing govern-
ment-funded counsel for refugees would mitigate these disparities.
The cost of such counsel to the government would be substantial but
not unreasonable in light of the stakes and the government's interests. In
2007, immigration judges made 42,653 merit decisions in asylum
cases. 14 9 Currently, one-third of asylum applicants are unrepresented
before an immigration judge. 150 Even though fewer than two-thirds of the
currently represented asylum applicants would continue to hire their own
counsel under the proposed scheme, those who could afford to pay for
counsel could be required to pay for the counsel they receive (similar to the
public defender system). 15 1 This requirement would partially offset the
fiscal costs. In any case, the cost of providing counsel to an asylum appli-
Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deporta-
tion: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 556-58
(2009) ("The cumulative impact of DHS's transfer policy is a significant disincentive for
private and pro bono attorneys to take on detained clients in removal proceedings.").
Shifting communication and travel costs onto the government would not only improve
representation, but also make clear to DHS the actual costs of its transfer policy.
143. See Morales Apolinar, 514 F.3d at 897.
144. See Friendly, supra note 133, at 1288 (raising the specter of a "protracted contro-
versy" if counsel is introduced to a given proceeding).
145. Further, the government already provides a limited right to counsel in such pro-
ceedings. See supra Part II.
146. See Friendly, supra note 133, at 1289 (explaining that the investigatory process
is driven by an active but independent judge and is not meant to be adversarial).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
148. See Friendly, supra note 133, at 1279-95 (listing these procedural protections).
149. EXECUTWE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REviEw, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION
COURTS, FY 2007 ASYLUM STATISTICS (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/
efoia/FY07AsyStats.pdf.
150. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 325.
151. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006) (providing that counsel shall be appointed to
criminal defendants only if a judge or magistrate, after reasonable inquiry, determine
that the defendant is financially unable to obtain counsel).
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cant whose life is at stake would not be greater than the price the govern-
ment is paying for its own counsel. 15 2
Other safeguards would further limit the administrative costs of such a
system. Most jurisdictions bar attorneys in death penalty cases from bring-
ing or defending proceedings based on frivolous claims and arguments. 15 3
A similar standard already applies to asylum claims. If a person knowingly
files a frivolous application for asylum, the applicant is "permanently ineli-
gible for any benefits."'1 4 This penalty, however, can only deter frivolous
claims by an applicant if someone familiar with the law informs the appli-
cant about the potential fallout. The immigration courts could use the
duty not to file frivolous claims as a mechanism for requiring lawyers to
police their own cases. 155 Indeed, one study indicated that knowledge of
the penalties involved reduces the number of frivolous claims, thereby
increasing efficiency and reducing the costs associated with processing
applications. 1
56
These safeguards, in addition to reducing the cost to the government,
would improve the correlation between the private interest and the proce-
dure sought. The disincentive for filing frivolous claims increases the like-
lihood that the more expensive beneficiaries of the representation will
deserve relief as refugees. As more deserving refugees acquire relief, the
U.S. government better complies with its treaty obligations and the "plainly
compelling" interest it has in the improvement of asylum procedures. 15 7
Furthermore, the government has strong interests (negative costs) that
favor providing counsel to indigent applicants. 15 8 First, the government
has an interest in meeting its treaty obligations. For example, the United
States has "'plainly compelling' interests in 'ensuring the reciprocal obser-
vance of the Vienna Convention, protecting relations with foreign govern-
ments, and demonstrating commitment to the role of international
152. Specifically, median public defender salaries range nationally from $47,435 for
those with less than one year of experience to $75,000 for those with more than fifteen
years of experience. See NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, 2008 PUBLIC SECTOR AND PUB-
LIC INTEREST ATORNEY SALARY REPORT 13 (2008).
153. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (1983),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule 3_i.html.
154. INA § 208(d)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2006).
155. The workload of government-provided counsel would, of course, be a concern.
However, for government counsel to perform other basic duties, e.g. competency and
candor to the tribunal, counsel would be required to have sufficient knowledge of her or
his cases to also know whether the claims made are frivolous. Requiring counsel to
know whether their claims presented are frivolous should not present any greater bur-
den than requiring counsel to be competent in developing claims and to be truthful to
the tribunal in which the claims are adjudicated.
156. See Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 23, at 746; Christopher Nugent, Strength-
ening Access to Justice: Prehearing Rights Presentations for Detained Respondents, 76 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 1077, 1078 (1999).
157. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1375 (2008) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); see also infra text accompanying notes 158-63.
158. See Grable, supra note 60, at 848 (arguing that the power to do something is a
separate consideration from whether it is in the party possessing the power's interest to
do it).
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law."" 5 9 Second, the government has an interest in speaking with one
voice in international relations.' 60 In the administrative context, "one
voice" implies procedures that guarantee uniformity, predictability, and
legitimacy. Where Congress creates administrative proceedings to enforce
treaty obligations, such proceedings not only implicate our relations with
other members of the international community but also our commitment
to carrying out the "supreme law of the land,"'16 1 as negotiated by the Pres-
ident with the advice and consent of the Senate.' 6 2
The government's interests in complying with treaty obligations sug-
gest that insofar as new or different procedural obligations would promote
compliance with those obligations, such compliance would help offset any
costs associated with such procedural obligations.
Moreover, requiring representation for refugees is narrowly tailored to
the interest of the correct determination of refugee status. Representa-
tion-and the lack thereof-is the strongest predictor of outcomes in asy-
lum cases before an immigration judge.163 Providing counsel would
improve consistency in the asylum process and assure refugees that their
most basic interest, "life, or all that makes it worth living,"'16 4 is protected.
Some commentators believe that despite the myriad procedures that
apply in death penalty cases, the quality of counsel is still the determina-
tive factor in the outcome.165 Where there are no similar procedural pro-
tections and no right to counsel, the presence or absence of counsel has
been shown to make an enormous difference. 166
The Supreme Court has said that, "[t]here can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a [person] gets depends on the amount of money
[the person] has."16 7 Unequal justice is exactly what is happening in asy-
lum, CAT, and restriction on removal cases-cases that are often a matter
of life and death to the litigants. Due process demands more.
159. Medellin, 552 U.S. _ 128 S. Ct. at 1375 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). See
supra text accompanying notes 76-88.
160. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), is the leading case for the one voice
theory of dormant foreign affairs power preemption; see Curtis Bradley, The Federal Judi-
cial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 Sup. CT. REV. 59, 78 (2006) (explain-
ing the importance of Zschernig); see also, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 139 (2d ed. 1996); Brannon P. Denning &Jack H. McCall,
Jr., The Constitutionality of State and Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign Countries: Affairs
of State, States' Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs? 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 307, 349-50
(1999); John Norton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE LJ. 248,
275-76 (1965).
161. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (explain-
ing the relationship of treaty obligations to other sources of federal law); Whitney v.
Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
162. See U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
163. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 340.
164. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
165. Stephen B. Bright, Essay, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE LJ. 1835 (1994).
166. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 7, at 341; see also Schoenholtz & Jacobs,
supra note 23, at 743 (finding that "representation [or lack thereofn matters considera-
bly" in the outcome of refugee proceedings).
167. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
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IV. Recommendations for Improving Access to Counsel
The argument that due process demands greater protections in immi-
gration proceedings is not new. The need for greater protection, as demon-
strated in the Stanford Study discussed above, 168 is obvious, and
numerous commentators have stated as much. Indeed, most representa-
tives, DHS attorneys, asylum officers, and immigration judges agree that
representation makes a difference for those seeking relief and promotes the
efficiency of the system. 16 9
One common argument for increased procedural safeguards in immi-
gration proceedings is that deportation effectively is a criminal punish-
ment not a civil fine.170 For example, Robert Pauw has argued that
deportation, particularly where it is coupled with permanent banishment,
is "an extremely cruel punishment."'17 1 Pauw highlights the absence of a
statute of limitations to grounds of deportability, the circumscribed role of
discretion after the passage of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), and the plain inhumanity of deporting long-
time residents based on long-forgotten crimes. 1 72
After examining arguments in favor of considering deportation a civil
168. See supra text accompanying notes 116-26.
169. See Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 23, at 740. See also Catholic Legal Immi-
gration Network, Inc. et al., Petition for Rulemaking to Promulgate Regulations Gov-
erning Appointment of Counsel for Immigrants in Removal Proceedings (June 29,
2009), available at http://www.immigrantjustice.org/component/option,com docman/
Itemid,O/taskdocdownload/gid,490/ (arguing that for removal proceedings to be fun-
damentally fair, counsel must be appointed for indigent noncitizens in certain
circumstances).
170. The Supreme Court consistently has held the opposite: the adjudication "is sim-
ply the ascertainment, by appropriate and lawful means, of the fact whether the condi-
tions exist upon which [C]ongress has enacted that an alien ... may remain within the
country. The order of deportation is not a punishment for crime." Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032,
1038 (1984); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 157 (1923); Bugaje-
witz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913). This conclusory ruling has been repeated
time and again by the courts, but no court has adequately justified why this sort of
reasoning applies to deportation findings but not to standard criminal proceedings (e.g.,
"we are not adjudicating guilt or innocence, but whether the defendant acted in a way
that contravened the statute"). See, e.g., LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1976); Bill Ong Hing, Providing a Second Chance, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1893, 1902
(2007) (describing deportation as "double punishment" and "the final and most perma-
nent punishment an individual can face"); Lisa Mendel, Note, The Court's Failure to Rec-
ognize Deportation as Punishment: A Critical Analysis of Judicial Deference, 5 SUFFOLK J.
TRIAL & App. ADVOC. 205, 216 (2000) (comparing deportation to other civil sanctions in
which the Court has extended the Ex Post Facto Clause); Stephen H. Legomsky, Deporta-
tion of an Alien for a Marijuana Conviction Can Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment:
Lieggi v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, 389 F. Supp. 12 (N.D.
Ill. 1975), 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 454, 456-58 (1975-76).
171. Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the
Constitution's Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 306, 340
(2000).
172. Id. at 333-36.
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remedy, 173 Pauw concludes that it is, in some instances, punishment. 174
This is especially true where there is no waiver to deportability, regardless
of whether the refugee's past conduct is relevant to her continued presence
in the United States. 175 He cites the aggravated felony, alien smuggling,
and false claims of citizenship grounds for deportability as some of the
best cases for finding deportation to be punishment. 17 6
Because Pauw considers deportation sometimes to be punishment, he
recommends concomitant procedural safeguards. 17 7 He argues that, at a
minimum, the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Ex
Post Facto Clause should limit the government's power in deportation hear-
ings. 178 He also argues that counsel should be guaranteed because "[iut is
not fundamentally fair to punish a person by permanently banishing him
from his home unless he has the assistance of counsel in the
proceedings." 179
The American Bar Association (ABA) has called for the establishment
of the right to government-funded counsel for persons "with potential relief
from removal" and to all "mentally ill and disabled persons in all immigra-
tion processes and procedures, whether or not potential relief may be avail-
able to them."'180 The ABA specifically has called for the legislative reversal
of § 1362.11 The ABA Commission on Immigration emphasizes the com-
plexity of immigration law, the language and cultural barriers facing immi-
grants, and the high stakes of immigration proceedings.' 8 2
Finally, similar to the argument set forth above, some commentators
have suggested that refugees facing deportation should have counsel
because of the dangers they face. 18 3 No one, however, draws on death pen-
alty jurisprudence to make their argument. 184 We agree that more process
is due under the Eldridge framework.
173. See supra note 27 (cases explaining that deportation is a civil remedy, not
punishment).
174. See Pauw, supra note 171, at 333-36.
175. Id. (citing United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993)).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 339-40.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 340.
180. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 107A 1, 9 (ABA Comm'n
on Immigration ed., 2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/midyear/
2006/107a.pdf.
181. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
182. REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES: RECOMMENDATION 107, supra note 180, at 2.
183. See, e.g., DAVID NGARUR KENNEY & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ASYLUM DENIED: A REFU-
GEE'S STRUGGLE FOR SAFETY IN AMERICA 314 (2008); Erin Craddock, Note, Torturous Conse-
quences and the Case of Maher Arar: Can Canadian Solutions "Cure" the Due Process
Deficiencies in U.S. Removal Proceedings?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 644-45 (2008)
("[Wjhen the alien faces removal to a country that engages in torture and, after removal,
the alien is in fact tortured, the cost of error is very high.").
184. See, e.g., KENNEY & SCHRAG, supra note 183 (arguing for a right to representation
for asylum seekers by comparing the asylum seekers' interests to those of criminal
defendants).
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By analogy to the death penalty context, we have shown that the inter-
ests of potential refugees in life and dignity demands access to free coun-
sel. Without this vital safeguard, § 1362 is unconstitutional. This right to
counsel should attach before the initiation of proceedings before an immi-
gration judge regardless of whether the non-citizen applied for relief affirm-
atively or defensively. This is the most cost-effective way in which to
optimize the benefits of legal counsel.18 5
Individuals who are granted asylum affirmatively by an immigration
officer will never have the need for free legal counsel to adjudicate their
claims. Furthermore, an affirmative grant of asylum mitigates the need to
create a new framework to screen colorable asylum claims from patently
frivolous claims. Instead, most affirmative claims are likely to be at least
colorable because of the risks associated with non-citizens making them-
selves known to authorities. The risk of deportation and permanent exclu-
sion is a significant deterrent to prevent wholly frivolous claims.
Furthermore, for both affirmative and defensive proceedings, provid-
ing counsel to indigent petitioners will reduce the number of claims that
lack merit (and thereby increase the efficiency of the system) for two rea-
sons. First, an attorney would be able to indicate to his client whether she
has a colorable claim for relief. Individuals without a colorable claim
would submit themselves to voluntary departure more readily, thereby
eliminating the costs associated with prolonged detention during appeals.
Providing counsel would thus improve the efficiency of both the judi-
cial arm of the immigration system and the detention system. Research
from "know your rights" presentations studies indicates that individuals
who are informed that they have no right to relief often opt for voluntary
departure. 18 6 Having an attorney analyze individual claims will not only
further improve efficiency in this manner but will have an additional bene-
fit. By analyzing claims individually, attorneys will ensure that potentially
meritorious claims are presented effectively, thereby minimizing the need
for protracted appeals of claims that were denied erroneously.
Second, attorneys have an ethical duty not to file frivolous claims.
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1 states that attorneys "shall
not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivo-
lous .... "187 An action is frivolous if a competent lawyer would believe
that the claim is "so lacking in merit that there is no substantial possibility
that the tribunal would accept it."' 8 8
Providing counsel will eliminate the need for immigration judges to
grant repeated continuances while petitioners attempt to seek counsel.
185. But see Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 23, at 745 (indicating that it may be
more cost-effective to provide counsel before the initiation of credible fear interviews
because testimony during those interviews directly impacts the rest of the litigation).
186. Id.
187. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule-3_l.html.
188. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS § 110 cmt. d (2000).
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Immigration judges often grant continuances because they prefer claims to
be presented by counsel. 189 It follows that under our proposal, courts
would not only dispose of asylum, CAT, and restriction on removal claims
more justly but more expeditiously as well.
V. Conclusion
We believe that due process requires free legal representation in immi-
gration proceedings involving claims for asylum, restriction on removal,
and relief under the CAT. The stakes are high, and it is fundamentally
unfair to ask a refugee to navigate the complexity of the U.S. immigration
system without the aid of counsel.
Deportation, particularly if it is permanent, amounts to punishment.
We neither aim to reject that argument nor to suggest that the ABA Com-
mission on Immigration is wrong to suggest that counsel is warranted in
those proceedings regardless. Instead, we seek to set forth an additional
reason why the Constitution requires Congress to provide additional due
process protection-erroneous deportation may result in death.
Death penalty jurisprudence, particularly the notion that "death is dif-
ferent," provides a compelling, heretofore unexplored argument for
increased procedural safeguards for refugees. We believe that because of
the stakes refugees face, they are among the best candidates for safeguards
like guaranteed counsel. Moreover, death penalty jurisprudence already
recognizes the need for increased protection when a litigant's life is on the
line. Even though "death is different" is rooted in the Eighth Amendment's
proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, the interest of the refugees
and those facing the death penalty is often the same: life and human
dignity.
Finally, courts have already held that numerous procedural protec-
tions are required based on the high stakes. The courts, therefore, would
not have to make an intellectual leap to find that the high stakes attendant
to potential death warrant increased protection. Whether or not deporta-
tion is punishment, the high stakes present in a refugee's hearing alone
furnish sufficient reason for increased protection. 190 The inherent respect
for human dignity upon which U.S. asylum and refugee law is based
demands as much.
189. Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 23, at 746.
190. Cf. LeTourneur v. INS, 538 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1976); Hing, supra note
170, at 1902 (describing deportation as "double punishment" and "the final and most
permanent punishment an individual can face"); Mendel, supra note 170, at 216-23
(comparing deportation to other civil sanctions to which the court has extended the Ex
Post Facto Clause); Legomsky, supra note 170, at 456-58.

